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The Spectre of an
Arms Race in the 
Western Balkans
In the last several years, the Western Balkans have engaged in 
growing defence spending and rearmament, often accompanied by 
strong language about a looming arms race and military competi-
tion. This Policy Brief investigates whether this is cause for concern 
and reaches two main conclusions:
❙  Although the ongoing military modernization in the Western Balkans 
has not violated the letter of the 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional 
Arms Control, the heated rhetoric erodes trust and undermines the 
spirit of cooperation and arms control.
❙  To prevent future escalation, this challenge must be taken seriously 
by the international community, Western Balkan states and their soci-
eties.
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THE SPECTRE OF AN ARMS RACE
Article IV of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
served as the basis for the conclusion of the 1996 
Florence Agreement. The Agreement, modelled after 
the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Trea-
ty, aimed to achieve transparency, confidence and a 
stable military balance through obligatory reductions 
in five categories of weapons: battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and com-
bat helicopters. The Agreement also introduced veri-
fication mechanisms, such as on-site inspections and 
regular information exchanges. Under the guidance 
of the OSCE, Western Balkan states fully implement-
ed the Agreement and assumed ownership over it in 
January 2015.
In late 2015, the media reported on Croatia’s consid-
eration to acquire the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket 
System from the U.S., with the capacity to carry mis-
siles with a range of up to 300 km. Serbia saw this as a 
threat that could shift the military balance in the region 
and considered purchasing the S-300 missile system 
from Russia. While none of these weapons were ulti-
mately procured, both states have since stepped up 
their military modernization. Sensationalist media re-
ports and heated political rhetoric about the looming 
arms race accompanied each new acquisition. 
Croatia’s ongoing military modernization has been 
motivated by a desire to close the gap with the NATO 
guideline of spending at least 2 % of GDP on defence. 
Although Croatian officials have denied the existence 
of an arms race, its media have frequently warned of 
it. Military modernization plans in the militarily neu-
tral Serbia, on the other hand, have been driven by 
its growing concerns about potential conflicts over 
Republika Srpska and northern Kosovo. Echoing the 
Serbian tabloids, which routinely raise the spectre of 
an arms race, Serbian policymakers have also used 
this language. Most recently, the U.S. has threatened 
Serbia with sanctions over its decision to acquire the 
Russian Pantsir-S1 air defence system. President 
Vučić justified the purchase by saying that Serbia 
would not become a “Bambi for slaughter” while Cro-
atia and Albania are rearming.1
These developments have raised concerns across the 
region. This was most visible in Kosovo, where policy-
makers used Serbia’s rearmament as another justifi-
cation for the transformation of the Kosovo Security 
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Forces into the Kosovo Armed Forces. Serbia called 
this “the most direct threat to peace and stability in 
the region” and has not ruled out military intervention 
if the new military is deployed in the Serb-populated 
north.2 For Russian officials, the creation of the new 
armed forces on what they view as territory belonging 
to one of the signatories (i.e. Serbia) is a violation of 
the Florence Agreement.3
MILITARY BUILD-UP IN NUMBERS
While the military expenditures of Western Balkan 
states as a percentage of their GDP decreased slight-
ly between 2014 and 2018, in absolute terms they 
rose steadily due to GDP growth.4 In 2019, defence 
budgets soared across the region – 9.8 % in Alba-
nia, 14 % in Montenegro, 20.3 % in Croatia, 27.7 % in 
North Macedonia, and 35 % in Serbia. All this has al-
lowed these states to invest more in military modern-
ization, although they all continue to fall short of the 
NATO guideline of spending at least 20 % of defence 
expenditures on equipment.
Serbia has acquired most of its new weapons from 
Russia, including jets (Mig 29), helicopters (Mi-17V-5 
and Mi-35M) and air defence systems (Pantsir-S1). 
Croatia obtained new weapons from the U.S. and its 
NATO allies, including armoured vehicles (MRAP), 
helicopters (Kiowa, Black Hawk) and artillery pieces 
(Panzerhaubitzen 2000). Other states in the region 
have followed suit and 
have stepped up military 
modernization. This has 
created the impression 
of an impending arms 
race by proxy. As the ta-
ble below shows, how-
ever, neither the quanti-
ty nor the quality of the 
procured weapons has 
undermined the military 
balance so far, as all the 
conventional forces are still below the limits set by the 
Florence Agreement.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While ongoing military modernization in the region 
has not yet undermined the letter of the Florence 
Agreement, the heated rhetoric of an arms race and 
military competition violates its spirit. If mutual trust 
continues to erode, the spectre of an arms race risks 
shifting from rhetoric to reality. To avoid future escala-
tion, several steps are needed. 
First, Western Balkan states should improve the trans-
parency of their military modernization plans and ac-
quisitions, along with their costs. Second, policymak-
ers and media in the Western Balkans should refrain 
from inflammatory rhetoric that erodes trust, fuels 
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Battle tanks  Armoured combat vehicles Artillery Combat aircraft Combat helicopters
Bosnia and Herzegovina 410/325 (79 %) 340/272 (80 %) 1500/1375 (92 %) 62/19 (31 %) 21/7 (33 %)
Croatia 410/232 (57 %) 340/219 (64 %) 1500/1397 (93 %) 62/12 (19 %) 21/16 (76 %)
Montenegro 77/0 (0 %) 64/6 (9 %) 375/107 (29 %) 12/4 (33 %) 7/5 (71 %)
Serbia 948/464 (49 %) 786/562 (72 %) 3375/2108 (62 %) 143/80 (56 %) 46/30 (65 %)
The balance of conventional armaments in the Western Balkans in 2019 
The figures in the table show: national ceiling/actual stock (percentage of the national ceiling). While the data in the table is not officially available, it was leaked 
to the media and re-confirmed in interviews.
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tensions and drives security dilemmas. Third, the 
OSCE should encourage parties to initiate discussion 
on how to revise and update the Florence Agreement 
in order to address its loopholes related to new cat-
egories of weapons (such as drones), the qualitative 
aspect of the military balance, the absence of consul-
tation mechanisms on military modernization plans 
and the creation of the Kosovo Armed Forces. Fourth, 
the OSCE should support the development of civilian 
expertise in the Western Balkans on the subject of 
arms control. Fifth, OSCE participating States should 
refrain from supplying Western Balkan states with 
weapons that could shift the military balance in the re-
gion. Sixth, the EU should monitor military moderniza-
tion and use accession negotiations to defuse military 
competition in the region. Seventh, NATO should bal-
ance its expectations concerning increased defence 
spending in the Western Balkans with legitimate con-
cerns about military stability and arms control. 
In sum, although the spectre of an arms race in the 
Western Balkans is still only rhetorical, this is no rea-
son for complacency. The language of military com-
petition undermines trust and feeds fears that may 
easily unravel two decades of peacebuilding in this 
still volatile corner of Europe.
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